Administrative: Disability benefits granted for anxiety and depression

In the case of the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Commission, which awarded benefits to a woman who suffered from anxiety and depression following a workplace accident, its decision was upheld. Her testimony, combined with medical evidence of her psychological symptoms and treatment, was sufficient to prove that the accident caused her anxiety and depression.

Background

On December 6, 2017, Sabrina Miller was injured while working for Virginia Commonwealth University/Commonwealth of Virginia, or VCU. Miller underwent several treatments, but the pain persisted. When the pain treatments failed and Miller lost her job, her mental health deteriorated.

Her doctor, Dr. William Moore, diagnosed Miller with unspecified depression and referred her to mental health treatment with Laurie Klatt, a licensed clinical social worker. After the first appointment with Miller, Klatt documented that Miller was suffering from depression, anxiety, crying spells, sleep and appetite disorders, and a lack of energy. Klatt found that Miller’s stressors included chronic pain, the loss of her job after the accident, a history of trauma, and the COVID pandemic.

Miller filed a workers’ compensation claim for his mental health treatment. The deputy commissioner dismissed the claim after determining that Miller lacked “competent medical evidence” to prove that the workplace accident had caused him anxiety and depression. The deputy commissioner concluded that Klatt’s opinions could not be considered because they had not been ratified by Dr. Moore.

The Commission reversed its decision. While it agreed that Dr. Moore had not endorsed Klatt’s opinion, that was not “determinative.” The Commission found that Miller’s testimony, combined with medical evidence of his psychological symptoms and his treatment, was sufficient to show that Miller’s accident had caused him anxiety and depression.

Analysis

VCU maintains that the Commission could not rely on Klatt’s opinions because they were not supported by Dr. Moore’s treatment records. VCU also claims that Miller’s testimony alone cannot establish causation. For VCU, the totality of the evidence failed to show that Miller’s workplace accident caused her anxiety and depression.

The Court disagrees. Even if Klatt’s opinion of causation were insufficient on its own because it was not ratified by Moore, Miller’s testimony under the facts presented here adequately demonstrated that the accident caused her anxiety and depression. Thus, the record as a whole supports the Commission’s conclusion that the accident caused Miller’s mental health conditions and her need for treatment.

VCU objects to this conclusion, arguing that because there is no objective evidence to determine mental health symptoms or injuries, a plaintiff’s testimony cannot establish causation. But a plaintiff’s testimony is not rendered irrelevant because laboratory tests cannot conclusively establish a mental health injury or measure its severity. This court has made clear that a plaintiff’s testimony in the circumstances of a particular case may be sufficient to prove causation.

Miller’s testimony in this case was sufficient under the circumstances. Not only did she testify that she experienced anxiety and depression for the first time after the accident, but she also demonstrated how the chronic pain she experienced due to her work injuries led to her depression and need for mental health treatment. And that testimony was corroborated by records from her health care providers. Therefore, the Commission acted within its discretion to determine that Miller’s work injury caused her need for mental health treatment.

Affirmed.

Virginia Commonwealth University/Commonwealth of Virginia v. Miller, docket no. February 23, 1859August 20, 2024. CAV (unpublished opinion) (per curiam). From the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Commission. (Jason S. Miyares, Solicitor General; Steven G. Popps, Deputy Solicitor General; Jacqueline C. Hedblom, Chief, Trial Section; Adam L. Katz, Senior Assistant Solicitor General, at brief), for appellant. (Adam J. Dourafei; Lauren Carroll; Commonwealth Law Group, at brief), for appellee. VLW 024-7-262. 6 pp.